Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. et al. v. Microsoft Corp. et al.

Pro-Sys Consultants v. Microsoft (2013), 345 B.C.A.C. 1 (SCC);

589 W.A.C. 1

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

…………………….

Temp. Cite: [2013] B.C.A.C. TBEd. OC.059

Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Neil Godfrey (appellants) v. Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (respondents) and Attorney General of Canada (intervener)

(34282; 2013 SCC 57; 2013 CSC 57)

Indexed As: Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. et al. v. Microsoft Corp. et al.

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner, JJ.

October 31, 2013.

Summary:

The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”) brought a class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for its Intel-compatible PC operating systems and Intel-compatible PC applications software. Pro-Sys sought certification of the action as a class proceeding under British Columbia’s Class Proceedings Act (CPA). The proposed class was made up of ultimate consumers (“indirect purchasers”) who acquired Microsoft products from re-sellers, re-sellers who themselves purchased the products either directly from Microsoft or from other re-sellers higher up the chain of distribution. Microsoft sought an order striking out the claim.

The British Columbia Supreme Court (Tysoe, J.), in a decision reported at [2006] B.C.T.C. Uned. C96, found causes of action under s. 36 of the Competition Act, in tort for conspiracy and intentional interference with economic interests and in restitution for waiver of tort. Tysoe, J., ordered that the portions of the pleadings dealing with unjust enrichment and constructive trust be struck out as they were not sufficient to support such claims. Upon further motion to amend the claims, Tysoe, J. allowed amendments to support the claims of unjust enrichment and constructive trust (see [2006] B.C.T.C. Uned. A69).

The British Columbia Supreme Court (Myers, J.), in a decision reported at [2010] B.C.T.C. Uned. 285, certified the action, finding that the remaining requirements for certification in s. 4(1) of the CPA were met. Microsoft appealed from the decisions of Tysoe, J., and Myers, J.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal, Donald, J.A., dissenting, in a decision reported at (2011), 304 B.C.A.C. 90; 513 W.A.C. 90, allowed the appeal. The court set aside the certification order and dismissed the action, finding it plain and obvious that the class members had no cause of action under s. 4(1)(a) of the CPA. The majority reached that conclusion after determining that indirect purchaser actions were not available as a matter of law in Canada. Pro-Sys appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal. The court determined the threshold issue and held that indirect purchasers could use passing on offensively to bring an action. The court also held that the causes of action under s. 36 of the Competition Act, in tort and in restitution (except for constructive trust) met the certification requirement of disclosing a cause of action. The court restored the orders of the applications judges allowing for certification of the action as a class proceeding with the exception that the pleadings based on constructive trust were struck.

Editor’s Note: This case was heard together with Sun-Rype Products Ltd. et al. v. Archer Daniels Midland et al., reported at 450 N.R. 287, and Infineon Technologies AG et al. v. Option Consommateurs et al., reported at 450 N.R. 355.

Damages – Topic 510

Limits of compensatory damages – General – Prohibition against double recovery – [See first
Restitution – Topic 696
].

Damages – Topic 513

Limits of compensatory damages – General – Defence of passing on – [See
Restitution – Topic 8005
].

Practice – Topic 208.4

Persons who can sue and be sued – Individuals and corporations – Status or standing – Class actions – Aggregate damages – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – Myers, J., certified the action as a class proceeding (Class Proceedings Act (B.C.)) – The British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside the certification order – Pro-Sys appealed – One issue was whether the question of aggregate assessment of damages was properly certified as a common issue – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “the common issues that were certified are whether damages can be determined on an aggregate basis and if so, in what amount. … I would not disturb the applications judge’s decision to certify these common issues. However, while the aggregate damages common issues certified by Myers J. deal only with the assessment of damages and not proof of loss, there is some confusion in his reasons about whether the aggregate damages provisions of the CPA may be relied on to establish proof of loss where proof of loss is an essential element of proving liability. … The aggregate damages provisions of the CPA relate to remedy and are procedural. They cannot be used to establish liability … an antecedent finding of liability is required before resorting to the aggregate damages provision of the CPA. … The question of whether damages assessed in the aggregate are an appropriate remedy can be certified as a common issue. However, this common issue is only determined at the common issues trial after a finding of liability has been made. The ultimate decision as to whether the aggregate damages provisions of the CPA should be available is one that should be left to the common issues trial judge. Further, the failure to propose or certify aggregate damages, or another remedy, as a common issue does not preclude a trial judge from invoking the provisions if considered appropriate once liability is found” – See paragraphs 127 to 135.

Practice – Topic 209.3

Persons who can sue and be sued – Individuals and corporations – Status or standing – Class or representative actions – Certification – Considerations (incl. when class action appropriate) – The representative plaintiffs brought an indirect purchaser action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – At issue was whether the action met the requirements for certification under s. 4(1) of the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.) – Microsoft argued that the lack of commonality between the class members and the abundance of individual issues signified that a class proceeding would not be a “fair, efficient and manageable method of advancing the claim” – It argued that the access to justice function of class actions would not be served by certifying the action because it would inevitably break down into numerous individual trials, subjecting the class members to delays – It also argued that the tendency of indirect purchaser actions to result in cy-près awards further frustrated the access to justice aim and that the objective of behaviour modification was more properly a concern for the Competition Commissioner – The Supreme Court of Canada did not accept Microsoft’s arguments – If the common issues were to be resolved, they would be determinative of Microsoft’s liability and of whether passing on of the overcharge to the indirect purchasers had occurred – It could be said that a resolution of the common issues would significantly advance the action – It was premature to assume that the award in this case would result in cy-près distribution or that the objective of access to justice would be frustrated on that account – Further, the Competition Bureau had said that it would not be pursuing any action against Microsoft – Accordingly, if the class action did not proceed, the objectives of deterrence and behaviour modification would not be addressed – The class action was not only the preferable procedure but the only procedure available to serve those objectives – See paragraphs 136 to 141.

Practice – Topic 209.3

Persons who can sue and be sued – Individuals and corporations – Status or standing – Class or representative actions – Certification – Considerations (incl. when class action appropriate) – [See
Practice – Topic 208.4
,
Restitution – Topic 128
, second
Restitution – Topic 696
, both
Torts – Topic 5086
and
Trade Regulation – Topic 506
].

Practice – Topic 209.7

Persons who can sue and be sued – Individuals and corporations – Status or standing – Class actions – Certification – Evidence and proof – In Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (2001 SCC), McLachlin C.J.C., stated “… the class representative must show some basis in fact for each of the certification requirements set out in … the Act, other than the requirement that the pleadings disclose a cause of action” – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “The Hollick standard has never been judicially interpreted to require evidence on a balance of probabilities. … The ‘some basis in fact’ standard does not require that the court resolve conflicting facts and evidence at the certification stage. … The standard for assessing evidence at certification does not give rise to ‘a determination of the merits of the proceeding’ ([Class Proceedings Act (B.C.], s. 5(7)); nor does it involve such a superficial level of analysis into the sufficiency of the evidence that it would amount to nothing more than symbolic scrutiny”- See paragraphs 99 to 105.

Practice – Topic 209.7

Persons who can sue and be sued – Individuals and corporations – Status or standing – Class actions – Certification – Evidence and proof – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – Myers, J., certified the action as a class proceeding pursuant to the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.) – The British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside the certification order – Pro-Sys appealed – The proposed common issues that asked whether loss to the class members could be established on a class-wide basis required the use of expert evidence in order for commonality to be established – Myers, J., had found that Pro-Sys’s expert, Dr. Netz, had demonstrated a plausible methodology for proving class-wide loss – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “… resolving conflicts between the experts is an issue for the trial judge and not one that should be engaged in at certification … For the purposes of certification and having regard to the deference due the applications judge on this issue, I would not interfere with the findings of Myers J. as to the commonality of the loss-related issues” – See paragraphs 114 to 126.

Practice – Topic 209.7

Persons who can sue and be sued – Individuals and corporations – Status or standing – Class actions – Certification – Evidence and proof – At issue was whether an indirect purchaser action against the respondents for alleged overcharging met the requirements for certification under s. 4(1) of the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.) – The respondents argued that the fact that the overcharge had been passed on to the class members (indirect purchasers) through the chain of distribution made it unfeasible to prove loss to each of the class members for the purposes of establishing common issues – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “In order to determine if the loss-related issues meet the ‘some basis in fact’ standard, some assurance is required that the questions are capable of resolution on a common basis. In indirect purchaser actions, plaintiffs generally seek to satisfy this requirement through the use of expert evidence in the form of economic models and methodologies. … It is not necessary at the certification stage that the methodology establish the actual loss to the class, as long as the plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a methodology capable of doing so. In indirect purchaser actions, this means that the methodology must be able to establish that the overcharges have been passed on to the indirect-purchaser level in the distribution chain. … the expert methodology must be sufficiently credible or plausible to establish some basis in fact for the commonality requirement. This means that the methodology must offer a realistic prospect of establishing loss on a class-wide basis so that, if the overcharge is eventually established at the trial of the common issues, there is a means by which to demonstrate that it is common to the class (i.e. that passing on has occurred). The methodology cannot be purely theoretical or hypothetical, but must be grounded in the facts of the particular case in question. There must be some evidence of the availability of the data to which the methodology is to be applied” – See paragraphs 114 to 118.

Restitution – Topic 67

Unjust enrichment – General – Persons entitled to claim – [See both
Restitution – Topic 696
].

Restitution – Topic 123

Unjust enrichment – Remedies – Constructive trust – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – At issue was whether the action met the requirements for certification under s. 4(1) of the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.), and in particular whether the pleadings disclosed a cause of action (s. 4(1)(a)) – As a remedy for the alleged unjust enrichment, Pro-Sys had submitted that an amount equal to the overcharge from the sales of Microsoft operating systems and Microsoft applications software in British Columbia should be held by Microsoft in trust for the class members – In other words, Pro-Sys was asking that Microsoft be constituted a constructive trustee in favour of Pro-Sys – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “As Pro-Sys’s claim neither explains why a monetary award is inappropriate or insufficient nor shows a link to specific property, the claim does not satisfy the conditions necessary to ground a constructive trust. On the pleadings, it is plain and obvious that Pro-Sys’s claim that an amount equal to the overcharge from the sale of Microsoft operating systems and Microsoft applications software in British Columbia should be held by Microsoft in trust for the class members cannot succeed. The pleadings based on constructive trust must be struck” – See paragraphs 90 to 92.

Restitution – Topic 128

Unjust enrichment – Remedies – Waiver of tort – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – At issue was whether the action met the requirements for certification under s. 4(1) of the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.), and in particular whether the pleadings disclosed a cause of action (s. 4(1)(a)) – As an alternative to the causes of action in tort, Pro-Sys waived the tort and sought to recover the unjust enrichment accruing to Microsoft – Microsoft advanced two arguments as to why this claim should be struck – First, it stated that Pro-Sys had pleaded waiver of tort as a remedy and not a cause of action, and therefore proof of loss was an essential element – Second, if waiver of tort was pleaded as a cause of action, the underlying tort must therefore be established, including the element of loss – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that neither argument provided a sufficient basis upon which to find that a claim in waiver of tort would plainly and obviously be unsuccessful – The court stated that “this appeal is not the proper place to resolve the details of the law of waiver of tort, nor the particular circumstances in which it can be pleaded. I cannot say that it is plain and obvious that a cause of action in waiver of tort would not succeed” – See paragraphs 93 to 97.

Restitution – Topic 696

Benefit acquired from the plaintiff – Recovery of money – Indirect purchasers (incl. offensive use of passing-on) – The representative plaintiffs brought an indirect purchaser class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – Referring to the rule in Illinois Brick (U.S. Supreme Court), Microsoft argued that the Supreme Court of Canada’s rejection of the passing-on defence in Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (2007 SCC) carried, as a necessary corollary, a corresponding rejection of the offensive use of passing on by indirect purchasers – The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that although the passing-on defence was unavailable as a matter of restitution law, it did not follow that indirect purchasers should be foreclosed from claiming losses passed on to them – The risks of multiple recovery and the concerns of complexity and remoteness were insufficient bases for precluding indirect purchasers from bringing actions against the defendants responsible for overcharges that may have been passed on to them – The deterrence function of the competition law in Canada was not likely to be impaired by indirect purchaser actions – While the passing-on defence was contrary to basic restitutionary principles, those same principles were promoted by allowing passing on to be used offensively – Although the rule in Illinois Brick remained good law at the federal level in the United States, its subsequent repeal at the state level in many jurisdictions and the report to Congress recommending its reversal demonstrated that its rationale was under question – The recent doctrinal commentary also favoured overturning the rule in Illinois Brick – The court’s rejection of the passing-on defence in previous cases and affirmed in this case did not preclude indirect purchaser actions – See paragraphs 30 to 60.

Restitution – Topic 696

Benefit acquired from the plaintiff – Recovery of money – Indirect purchasers (incl. offensive use of passing-on) – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – At issue was whether the action met the requirements for certification under s. 4(1) of the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.), and in particular whether the pleadings disclosed a cause of action (s. 4(1)(a)) – Pro-Sys said that Microsoft was unjustly enriched by the overcharge to its direct purchasers that was passed through the chain of distribution to the class members – Microsoft argued that any enrichment it received came from the direct purchasers, and not from the class members, and that this lack of a direct connection between it and the class members foreclosed the claim of unjust enrichment – Additionally, it said that the contracts between Microsoft and the direct purchasers and the contracts between the direct purchasers and the indirect purchasers constituted a juristic reason for the enrichment – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that at this stage it could not conclude that it was plain and obvious that a claim in unjust enrichment would be made out only where the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was direct – With regard to Microsoft’s juristic reason justification, the question of whether the contracts were illegal and void (as plead by Pro-Sys) should not be resolved at this stage of the proceedings – Those questions had to be left to the trial judge – It was not plain and obvious that the claim in unjust enrichment could not succeed – See paragraphs 85 to 89.

Restitution – Topic 8005

Defences – General – Passing-on – The passing-on defence was rejected in Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance) (2007 SCC) in the context of a claim for the recovery of taxes paid pursuant to ultra vires legislation – The Supreme Court of Canada held that rejection of the passing-on defence in Kingstreet was not limited to the context of ultra vires taxes – The court stated that “First, this Court’s jurisprudence supports the broader rejection of the passing-on defence. … Second, in Kingstreet, Bastarache J. found that the rejection of the passing-on defence was consistent with basic restitutionary law principles. … Finally, there is support in the academic commentary for the broader rejection of the passing-on defence … There is no principled reason to reject the defence in one context but not another; the passing-on defence is rejected throughout the whole of restitutionary law” – See paragraphs 18 to 29.

Torts – Topic 5084

Interference with economic relations – Conspiracy – Unlawful conduct or unlawful means conspiracy – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – At issue was whether the action met the requirements for certification under s. 4(1) of the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.), and in particular whether the pleadings disclosed a cause of action (s. 4(1)(a)) – Microsoft argued that the claims for unlawful means conspiracy and intentional interference with economic interests should be struck because their common element requiring the use of “unlawful means” could not be established – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “These alleged causes of action must be dealt with summarily as the proper approach to the unlawful means requirement common to both torts is presently under reserve in this Court in Bram Enterprises Ltd. v. A.I. Enterprises Ltd. … Suffice it to say that at this point it is not plain and obvious that there is no cause of action in unlawful means conspiracy or in intentional interference with economic interests. I would therefore not strike these claims” – See paragraphs 80 to 83.

Torts – Topic 5086

Interference with economic relations – Conspiracy – Conspiracy to injure – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – At issue was whether the action met the requirements for certification under s. 4(1) of the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.), and in particular whether the pleadings disclosed a cause of action (s. 4(1)(a)) – Microsoft argued that the tort of predominant purpose conspiracy was not made out because Pro-Sys’s statement of claim failed to identify one true predominant purpose – Microsoft submitted that by pleading that it was “motivated solely by economic considerations”, Pro-Sys in effect conceded that the predominant purpose of Microsoft’s alleged conduct could not have been to cause injury to the plaintiff as required under the law – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “Pro-Sys argues that its pleadings state that Microsoft acted with the predominant purpose of injuring the class members which resulted in, among other things, increased profits. While the pleadings could have been drafted with a more precise focus, I would hesitate on a pleadings application to rule definitively that the predominant purpose conspiracy pleading is so flawed that no cause of action is disclosed. At this stage, I cannot rule out Pro-Sys’s explanation that Microsoft’s primary intent was to injure the plaintiffs and that unlawfully increasing its profits was a result of that intention. For this reason, I cannot say it is plain and obvious that Pro-Sys’s claim in predominant purpose conspiracy cannot succeed” – See paragraphs 74 to 78.

Torts – Topic 5086

Interference with economic relations – Conspiracy – Conspiracy to injure – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser class action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – At issue was whether the action met the requirements for certification under s. 4(1) of the Class Proceedings Act (B.C.), and in particular whether the pleadings disclosed a cause of action (s. 4(1)(a)) – Microsoft argued that the claim for the tort of predominant purpose conspiracy should be struck to the extent it applied as between corporate affiliates because “[p]arent and wholly-owned subsidiary corporations always act in combination” – Pro-Sys said that “[t]his is not true as a matter of law” – Both parties cited Smith v. National Money Mart Co. (2006 ONCA), which said that “there can be a conspiracy between a parent and a subsidiary corporation” – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “this statement appears to leave open a cause of action in predominant purpose conspiracy even when the conspiracy is between affiliated corporations. Again, it would not be appropriate on a pleadings application to make a definitive ruling on this issue” – It was not plain and obvious that the predominant purpose conspiracy claim as it applied to an alleged conspiracy between a parent corporation and its subsidiaries should be struck at this stage – See paragraph 79.

Torts – Topic 5098

Interference with economic relations – Conspiracy – Pleading – [See first
Torts – Topic 5086
].

Trade Regulation – Topic 506

Competition – General – Civil remedy (Competition Act, s. 36) – The representative plaintiffs, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. and Godfrey (collectively “Pro-Sys”), brought an indirect purchaser action against Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Canada Co./Microsoft Canada CIE (collectively “Microsoft”) alleging that Microsoft engaged in unlawful conduct by overcharging for operating systems and applications software – Myers, J., certified the action as a class proceeding (Class Proceedings Act (B.C.)) – The British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside the certification order – Pro-Sys appealed – Microsoft argued that the cause of action under s. 36 of the Competition Act was not properly pleaded because it was not included in Pro-Sys’s Statement of Claim – Microsoft argued that any attempt to add it now would be barred by the two-year limitation period in s. 36(4) of the Competition Act – The Supreme Court of Canada found Microsoft’s contention to be a purely technical objection, and not a basis to dismiss the claim – The Third Further Amended Statement of Claim alleged that the unlawful conduct was continuing, a fact that had be accepted as true for the purposes of the appeal – As a result, it could not be said that the action was not filed in a timely manner – Moreover, the Third Further Amended Statement of Claim stated that “[t]he plaintiffs plead and rely upon . . . . Part VI of the Competition Act” and sought damages accordingly – Although it did not expressly refer to s. 36, recovery for breaches under Part VI of the Competition Act could only be sought by private individuals through a claim under s. 36 – The court therefore rejected Microsoft’s argument that the claim should be barred by the limitation provision of the Competition Act – Microsoft had also argued that the Competition Tribunal should have jurisdiction over the enforcement of competition law – However, s. 36 expressly provided that any person who suffered loss by virtue of a breach of Part VI of the Act could seek to recover that loss and the section expressly conferred jurisdiction on the court to entertain such claims – It was not plain and obvious that a claim under s. 36 of the Competition Act would be unsuccessful – For the purposes of s. 4(1)(a) of the CPA, it could not be said that the pleadings did not disclose a cause of action under s. 36 of the Competition Act – See paragraphs 65 to 71.

Trade Regulation – Topic 513

Competition – General – Limitation period – [See
Trade Regulation – Topic 506
].

Cases Noticed:

Sun-Rype Products Ltd. et al. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. et al. (2011), 305 B.C.A.C. 55; 515 W.A.C. 55; 2011 BCCA 187, refd to. [para. 12].

Infineon Technologies AG et al. v. Option consommateurs et al. (2013), 450 N.R. 355; 2013 SCC 59, refd to. [para. 13].

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. (1968), 392 U.S. 481 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 19].

Kingstreet Investments Ltd. et al. v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance) et al., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3; 355 N.R. 336; 309 N.B.R.(2d) 255; 799 A.P.R. 255; 2007 SCC 1, consd. [para. 21].

Commissioner of State Revenue (Victoria) v. Royal Insurance Australia Ltd. (1994), 182 C.L.R. 51 (H.C.A.), refd to. [para. 22].

British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74; 321 N.R. 1; 198 B.C.A.C. 1; 324 W.A.C. 1; 2004 SCC 38, refd to. [para. 25].

Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co. (1918), 245 U.S. 531, refd to. [para. 25].

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (1977), 431 U.S. 720 (Sup. Ct.), consd. [para. 31].

Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161; 44 N.R. 181, refd to. [para. 39].

Chadha v. Bayer Inc. et al. (2003), 168 O.A.C. 143; 63 O.R.(3d) 22 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 43].

California v. ARC America Corp. (1989), 490 U.S. 93, refd to. [para. 51].

Elder Advocates of Alberta Society et al. v. Alberta et al., [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261; 416 N.R. 198; 499 A.R. 345; 514 W.A.C. 345; 2011 SCC 24, refd to. [para. 63].

Hunt v. T & N plc et al., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959; 117 N.R. 321, refd to. [para. 63].

Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) et al., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158; 277 N.R. 51; 153 O.A.C. 279; 2001 SCC 68, refd to. [para. 63].

Mulcahy v. The Queen (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 306, refd to. [para. 72].

Golden Capital Securities Ltd. v. Holmes et al. (2004), 205 B.C.A.C. 54; 337 W.A.C. 54; 2004 BCCA 565, refd to. [para. 72].

Canada Cement LaFarge Ltd. et al. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd. et al., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452; 47 N.R. 191, refd to. [para. 74].

Smith v. National Money Mart Co. et al. (2006), 209 O.A.C. 190; 80 O.R.(3d) 81 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2006] 1 S.C.R. xii; 359 N.R. 398, refd to. [para. 79].

Correia v. Canac Kitchens et al. (2008), 240 O.A.C. 153; 91 O.R.(3d) 353; 2008 ONCA 506, refd to. [para. 81].

OBG Ltd. v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 81].

Bram Enterprises Ltd. et al. v. A.I. Enterprises Ltd. et al. (2012), 387 N.B.R.(2d) 215; 1001 A.P.R. 215; 2012 NBCA 33, leave to appeal granted, [2012] 3 S.C.R. v; 447 N.R. 385, refd to. [para. 83].

Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629; 319 N.R. 38; 186 O.A.C. 128; 2004 SCC 25, refd to. [para. 85].

Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436; 19 N.R. 91, refd to. [para. 85].

Becker v. Pettkus, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834; 34 N.R. 384, refd to. [para. 85].

Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 762; 144 N.R. 1; 59 O.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 87].

Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada – see Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario.

Kerr v. Baranow, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269; 411 N.R. 200; 300 B.C.A.C. 1; 509 W.A.C. 1; 274 O.A.C. 1; 2011 SCC 10, refd to. [para. 91].

United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 93].

Serhan et al. v. Johnson & Johnson et al. (2006), 213 O.A.C. 298; 85 O.R.(3d) 665 (Div. Ct.), refd to. [para. 95].

National Trust Co. v. Gleason (1879), 77 N.Y. 400, refd to. [para. 96].

Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Board, Inc. (1920), 268 F. 575 (S.D.N.Y.), refd to. [para. 96].

Mahesan v. Malaysia Government Officers’ Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., [1979] A.C. 374 (P.C.), refd to. [para. 96].

Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. International Transport Workers Federation, [1983] A.C. 366 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 96].

Zidaric v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd., [2000] O.T.C. Uned. E51; 5 C.C.L.T.(3d) 61 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 96].

Reid v. Ford Motor Co. et al., [2006] B.C.T.C. 712; 2006 BCSC 712, refd to. [para. 96].

Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Infineon Technologies AG et al. (2009), 277 B.C.A.C. 271; 469 W.A.C. 271; 98 B.C.L.R.(4th) 272; 2009 BCCA 503, refd to. [para. 99].

Cloud et al. v. Canada (Attorney General) et al. (2004), 192 O.A.C. 239; 73 O.R.(3d) 401 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 99].

Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, Re (2008), 552 F.3d 305 (3rd Cir.), refd to. [para. 101].

Irving Paper Ltd. v. Atofina Chemicals Inc. (2009), 99 O.R.(3d) 358 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 102].

Hague v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (2004), 13 C.P.C.(6th) 1 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 102].

Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. et al. v. Dutton et al., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534; 272 N.R. 135; 286 A.R. 201; 253 W.A.C. 201; 2001 SCC 46, refd to. [para. 108].

In Re: Linerboard Antitrust Litigation (2002), 305 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir.), refd to. [para. 115].

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011), 131 S.Ct. 2541, refd to. [para. 117].

Steele et al. v. Toyota Canada Inc. et al. (2011), 306 B.C.A.C. 132; 516 W.A.C. 132; 329 D.L.R.(4th) 389; 2011 BCCA 98, refd to. [para. 130].

2038724 Ontario Ltd. et al. v. Quizno’s Canada Restaurant Corp. et al. (2010), 265 O.A.C. 134; 100 O.R.(3d) 721; 2010 ONCA 466, refd to. [para. 131].

Statutes Noticed:

Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, sect. 4(1) [para. 62]; sect. 4(2) [para. 136]; sect. 29(1), sect. 29(2) [para. 127].

Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, sect. 36 [para. 65], sect. 45(1), sect. 52(1) [para. 66].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Antitrust Modernization Commission: Report and Recommendations, Washington, D.C.: The Commission, 2007 (online: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm), p. 269 [para. 51].

Beatson, J., The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment: Essays on the Law of Restitution (1991), generally [para. 96].

British Columbia, Hansard, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, vol. 20, No. 20, 4th Sess., 35th Parliament (June 6, 1995), p. 15078 [para. 133].

Cullity, Maurice, Certification in Class Proceedings – The Curious Requirement of “Some Basis in Fact” (2011), 51 Can. Bus. L.J. 407, p. 422 [para. 101].

Eizenga, Michael A., et al., Class Actions Law and Practice (2nd Ed. 2009) (loose-leaf updated March 2013, release 21), p. 3-34.6 [para. 106].

Friedmann, Daniel, Restitution for Wrongs: The Basis of Liability, in W.R. Cornish, et al., eds., Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (1998), p. 133 [para. 96].

Gavil, Andrew I., Thinking Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal for Reform (2009), 76 Antitrust L.J. 167, p. 170 [para. 58].

Glover, J. Maria, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law (2012), 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1137, p. 1187 [para. 57].

Hansard (B.C.) – see British Columbia, Hansard, Debates of the Legislative Assembly.

Harris, Robert G., and Sullivan, Lawrence A., Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis (1979), 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 269, pp. 351, 352 [para. 53].

Landes, William M., and Posner, Richard A., Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing To Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick” (1979), 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602, pp. 605, 608, 609, 634, 635 [para. 52].

Landes, William M., and Posner, Richard A., The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan (1980), 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1274, p. 1278 [para. 54].

Maddaugh, Peter D., and McCamus, John D., The Law of Restitution (2004) (loose-leaf updated September 2005), pp. 3-1 to 3-3 [para. 50]; 11-45 [para. 22]; 24-1, 24-2, 24-4 [para. 93]; 24-20 [para. 96].

Maddaugh, Peter D., and McCamus, John D., The Law of Restitution (2013) (loose-leaf updated May 2013, release 10), p. 11-46 [para. 28].

O’Connor, Kevin J., Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling? (2001), 15:3 Antitrust 34, p. 38 [para. 57].

Osborne, Philip H., The Law of Torts (4th Ed. 2011), p. 336 [para. 81].

Thimmesch, Adam, Beyond Treble Damages: Hanover Shoe and Direct Purchaser Suits After Comes v. Microsoft Corp. (2005), 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1649, p. 1668, fn. 127 [para. 57].

Van Cott, Charles C., Standing at the Fringe: Antitrust Damages and the Fringe Producer (1983), 35 Stan. L. Rev. 763, p. 775 [para. 58].

Werden, Gregory J., and Schwartz, Marius, Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations – An Economic Analysis (1984), 35 Hastings L.J. 629, pp. 638, 639 [para. 56].

Counsel:

J.J. Camp, Q.C., Reidar Mogerman, Melina Buckley and Michael Sobkin, for the appellants;

Neil Finkelstein, James Sullivan, Catherine Beagan Flood and Brandon Kain, for the respondents;

John S. Tyhurst, for the intervener.

Solicitors of Record:

Camp Fiorante Matthews Mogerman, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the appellants;

McCarthy Tétrault, Toronto, Ontario; Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Vancouver, British Columbia and Toronto, Ontario, for the respondents;

Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, for the intervener.

This appeal was heard on October 17, 2012, before McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada. The following judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Rothstein, J., in both official languages on October 31, 2013.

Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. et al. v. Microsoft Corp. et al.

Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. et al. v. Microsoft Corp. et al., (2013), 345 B.C.A.C. 1 (SCC) Full text

Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. et al. v. Microsoft Corp. et al.

(2013), 345 B.C.A.C. 1 (SCC)