R. v. Beatty (J.R.) (2008), 251 B.C.A.C. 7 (SCC);
420 W.A.C. 7
MLB headnote and full text
[French language version follows English language version]
[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]
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Temp. Cite: [2008] B.C.A.C. TBEd. FE.050
Justin Ronald Beatty (appellant) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent)
(31550; 2008 SCC 5; 2008 CSC 5)
Indexed As: R. v. Beatty (J.R.)
Supreme Court of Canada
McLachlin, C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein, JJ.
February 22, 2008.
Summary:
The Crown appealed the accused’s acquittal on three counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death. The accused’s vehicle crossed the centre line of the highway, striking another vehicle and killing its three occupants. The accident resulted solely from a momentary lapse of attention.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a judgment reported (2006), 225 B.C.A.C. 154; 371 W.A.C. 154, allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. The trial judge failed to properly apply the law as laid down in R. v. Hundal (S.C.C.). The accused appealed.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge’s acquittal.
Criminal Law – Topic 1391
Motor vehicles – Dangerous driving – What constitutes – The accused’s truck fully crossed the centre line on a turn, colliding with an oncoming vehicle and killing its three occupants – The accused was travelling at the posted speed limit, was driving properly until he crossed the centre line, and alcohol and drugs were not involved – The accused claimed that he either lost consciousness because of heat stroke or fell asleep – The trial judge acquitted the accused of dangerous driving causing death – He held that a momentary lapse of attention did not constitute dangerous driving, as such was not a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in like circumstances (i.e. driving not objectively dangerous under the modified objective test in Hundal) – The British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered a new trial – Whether a momentary lapse of attention constituted dangerous driving was not the issue – Crossing the centre line in the face of oncoming traffic was objectively dangerous – The issue to be determined at trial was whether the accused’s explanation for crossing the centre line raised a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person in like circumstances ought to have been aware of the risk and the danger involved in the manner in which the accused drove (i.e. second step of Hundal test) – The Supreme Court of Canada restored the acquittal – The Court of Appeal’s approach erroneously placed a burden on the accused to disprove the requisite mens rea – The trial judge did not err in finding insufficient evidence to establish a marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent driver – Accordingly, the accused lacked the requisite mens rea to found criminal liability – See paragraphs 1 to 54.
Criminal Law – Topic 1393
Motor vehicles – Dangerous driving – Intention or mens rea – The Supreme Court of Canada set out the mens rea of the offence of dangerous driving as: “the trier of fact must also be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s objectively dangerous conduct was accompanied by the required mens rea. In making the objective assessment, the trier of fact should be satisfied on the basis of all the evidence, including evidence about the accused’s actual state of mind, if any, that the conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s circumstances. Moreover, if an explanation is offered by the accused, then in order to convict, the trier of fact must be satisfied that a reasonable person in similar circumstances ought to have been aware of the risk and of the danger involved in the conduct manifested by the accused. … while proof of subjective mens rea will clearly suffice, it is not essential. In the case of negligence-based offences such as this one, doing the proscribed act with the absence of the appropriate mental state of care may instead suffice to constitute the requisite fault. The presence of objective mens rea is determined by assessing the dangerous conduct as against the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver. If the dangerous conduct constitutes a ‘marked departure’ from that norm, the offence will be made out. … what constitutes a ‘marked departure’ from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver is a matter of degree. The lack of care must be serious enough to merit punishment.” – See paragraphs 43, 48.
Criminal Law – Topic 1394
Motor vehicles – Dangerous driving – Elements of offence – The Supreme Court of Canada set out the actus reus of the offence of dangerous driving as: “the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, viewed objectively, the accused was, in the words of the section, driving in a manner that was ‘dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place'” – It was the manner of driving at issue, not the consequences of the driving – The court stated that the consequence, such as persons killed, may assist in assessing the risk involved, but it did not answer the question whether or not the vehicle was operated in a manner dangerous to the public – See paragraphs 43, 46.
Criminal Law – Topic 1395
Motor vehicles – Dangerous driving – Evidence and proof – [See
Criminal Law – Topic 1391
].
Cases Noticed:
R. v. Hundal (S.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867; 149 N.R. 189; 22 B.C.A.C. 241; 38 W.A.C. 241, appld. [para. 2].
R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299; 21 N.R. 295, refd to. [para. 22].
R. v. Pappajohn, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120; 32 N.R. 104, refd to. [para. 23].
Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; 63 N.R. 266, refd to. [para. 24].
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636; 81 N.R. 115; 10 Q.A.C. 161; 68 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 281; 209 A.P.R. 281, refd to. [para. 26].
R. v. Tutton and Tutton, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392; 98 N.R. 19; 35 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 27].
R. v. Waite, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1436; 98 N.R. 69; 35 O.A.C. 51, refd to. [para. 27].
R. v. Finlay, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103; 156 N.R. 374; 113 Sask.R. 241; 52 W.A.C. 241, refd to. [para. 31].
R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3; 157 N.R. 1; 65 O.A.C. 321, refd to. [para. 34].
R. v. Anderson, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 265; 105 N.R. 143; 64 Man.R.(2d) 161, refd to. [para. 46].
R. v. Willock (C.) (2006), 212 O.A.C. 82; 210 C.C.C.(3d) 60 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 47].
R. v. Mann, [1966] S.C.R. 238, refd to. [para. 69].
Counsel:
Alexander P. Watt and Jaime D. Ashby, for the appellant;
Alexander Budlovsky, for the respondent.
Solicitors of Record:
Cates Carroll Watt, Kamloops, B.C., for the appellant;
Attorney General of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., for the respondent.
This appeal was heard on October 19, 2007, before McLachlin, C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.
On February 22, 2008, the judgment of the Court was delivered in both official languages and the following opinions were filed:
Charron, J. (Bastarache, Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein, JJ., concurring) – see paragraphs 1 to 54;
McLachlin, C.J.C. (Binnie and Lebel, JJ., concurring) – see paragraphs 55 to 82;
Fish, J. – see paragraphs 83 to 91.
