R. v. Chaplin (D.A.) (1995), 162 A.R. 272 (SCC);

    83 W.A.C. 272

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[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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David Allan Chaplin and Dale Leonard Chaplin (appellants) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent) and Attorney General of Canada (intervenor)

(23865)

Indexed As: R. v. Chaplin (D.A.) et al.

Supreme Court of Canada

Lamer, C.J.C., La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major, JJ.

February 23, 1995.

Summary:

The accused were charged with 22 counts of break, enter and theft. The trial judge stayed the charges when the Crown refused to disclose certain information, claiming it was irrelevant. The Crown appealed.

The Alberta Court of Appeal, in a judg­ment reported 145 A.R. 153; 55 W.A.C. 153, allowed the appeal, set aside the stay and ordered a new trial. The accused appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

Criminal Law – Topic 4505

Procedure – Trial – Special duties of Crown – Duty to disclose evidence prior to trial – The accused sought disclosure of whether they were the subject of any wiretap authorizations – The Crown advised that no authorizations existed respecting the charges they faced, but refused to disclose whether authorizations existed for other matters – The trial judge ordered disclosure – The Crown refused on the ground that the information sought was not relevant – The trial judge stayed the charges without giving the Crown an opportunity to prove the information was irrelevant – The Alberta Court of Appeal set aside the stay – Evidence not estab­lished by an accused to be relevant need not be disclosed – A finding of relevance could not be based on a theoretical possi­bility founded upon the conjecture of defence counsel – There must be some evidence giving an air of reality to what was otherwise speculation – The Crown was also denied adjudicative fairness, where it should have been afforded an opportunity to call evidence to justify its refusal to disclose the information – The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the decision.

Criminal Law – Topic 4505

Procedure – Trial – Special duties of Crown – Duty to disclose evidence prior to trial – The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that “the Crown is under a gen­eral duty to disclose
all
information, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, except evidence that is beyond the control of the prosecution, clearly irrelevant or privi­leged” – The court stated that “in situ­ations in which the existence of certain information has been identified, then the Crown must justify nondisclosure by demonstrating either that the information sought is beyond its control, or that it is clearly irrelevant or privileged. The trial judge must afford the Crown an oppor­tunity to call evidence to justify such allegation of nondisclosure.” – See para­graphs 25 to 29.

Criminal Law – Topic 4505

Procedure – Trial – Special duties of Crown – Duty to disclose evidence prior to trial – The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that “the Crown is under a gen­eral duty to disclose
all
information, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, except evidence that is beyond the control of the prosecution, clearly irrelevant or privi­leged” – The court stated that where the existence of undisclosed information was denied the accused must establish a basis to conclude that potentially relevant infor­mation did exist – “Relevance means that there is a reasonable possibility of being useful to the accused in making full answer and defence. … the requirement that the defence provide a basis for its demand for further production serves to preclude speculative, fanciful, disruptive, unmeritorious, obstructive and time-con­suming disclosure requests. … Fishing expeditions and conjecture must be sepa­rated from legitimate requests for dis­closure. … If the defence establishes a basis … the Crown must then justify a continuing refusal to disclose. … if the matter cannot be resolved without viva voce evidence, the Crown must be afforded an opportunity to call evidence.” – See paragraphs 30 to 33.

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; 130 N.R. 277; 120 A.R. 161; 8 W.A.C. 161; 68 C.C.C.(3d) 1, refd to. [para. 1].

R. v. Dersch (W.W.) et al., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505; 116 N.R. 340; 43 O.A.C. 256; 36 Q.A.C. 258; [1991] 1 W.W.R. 231; 80 C.R.(3d) 299; 60 C.C.C.(3d) 132; 50 C.R.R. 272; 77 D.L.R.(4th) 473; 51 B.C.L.R.(2d) 145, dist. [para. 14].

R. v. Roach (1985), 66 A.R. 73; 23 C.C.C.(3d) 262 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 18].

R. v. Simon (1992), 54 O.A.C. 398 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 18].

R. v. Egger (J.H.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 451; 153 N.R. 272; 141 A.R. 81; 46 W.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 21].

R. v. Hutter (W.) (1993), 67 O.A.C. 307; 86 C.C.C.(3d) 81 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 26].

R. v. Durette et al., [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469; 163 N.R. 321; 70 O.A.C. 1, dist. [para. 28].

R. v. Desjardins et al. (No. 5) (1991), 88 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 149; 274 A.P.R. 149 (Nfld. T.D.), refd to. [para. 29].

R. v. Sanelli, Duarte and Fasciano, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; 103 N.R. 86; 37 O.A.C. 322; 53 C.C.C.(3d) 1; 65 D.L.R.(4th) 240; 74 C.R.(3d) 281; 45 C.R.R. 278, refd to. [para. 32].

R. v. Duarte – see R. v. Sanelli, Duarte and Fasciano.

R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421; 116 N.R. 241; 43 O.A.C. 1; 36 Q.A.C. 161; 60 C.C.C.(3d) 161; 80 C.R.(3d) 317; 50 C.R.R. 206, refd to. [para. 33].

Statutes Noticed:

Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, sect. 37(2) [para. 25].

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, sect. 7, sect. 10(b), sect. 11(d) [para. 8].

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 187 [para. 32]; sect. 189(2), sect. 193(2) [para. 8]; sect. 196 [para. 16]; sect. 625.1(2) [para. 3]; sect. 691(2)(a) [para. 11].

Criminal Law Amendment Act, R.S.C. 1985 (1st Supp.), c. 27, sect. 127 [para. 3].

Counsel:

David J. Martin, for the appellants;

Jack Watson, Q.C., for the respondent;

Ronald C. Reimer, for the intervenor.

Solicitors of Record:

David J. Martin, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the appellants;

Attorney General for Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, for the respondent;

Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, for the intervenor.

This appeal was heard on October 6, 1994, before Lamer, C.J.C., La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

On February 23, 1995, Sopinka, J., delivered the following judgment in both official languages for the Supreme Court of Canada.

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R. v. Chaplin (D.A.) et al.

(1995), 162 A.R. 272 (SCC)

Court:
Supreme Court of Canada
Reading Time:
17 minutes
Judges:
Cory, Gonthier, Iacobucci, L’Heureux-Dubé, La Forest, Lamer, Major, McLachlin, Sopinka 
[1]

Sopinka, J.
: This appeal concerns the limits of Crown disclosure obligations in criminal prosecutions, flowing from this court’s decision in
R. v. Stinchcombe
, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; 130 N.R. 277; 120 A.R. 161; 8 W.A.C. 161; 68 C.C.C.(3d) 1, and amplifies the procedural structure of disclosure obligations as articulated in
Stinchcombe
, and subsequent case law. Specifically, the issue is whether an accused facing trial on a criminal charge is entitled to know if he or she has been named as a primary or secondary target in any wiretap authorizations unrelated to the investigation of the current criminal charge, obtained in the period from the charge up to the time of trial.

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