R. v. Lacasse (T.) (2015), 478 N.R. 319 (SCC)
MLB headnote and full text
[French language version follows English language version]
[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]
…………………….
Temp. Cite: [2015] N.R. TBEd. DE.019
Her Majesty The Queen (appellant) v. Tommy Lacasse (respondent) and Attorney General of Alberta (intervenor)
(36001; 2015 SCC 64; 2015 CSC 64)
Indexed As: R. v. Lacasse (T.)
Supreme Court of Canada
McLachlin, C.J.C., Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon and Côté, JJ.
December 17, 2015.
Summary:
The 20 year old accused pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired driving causing death. The intoxicated accused, driving 130 kmph, attempted to make a turn having a recommended speed of 75 kmph. The vehicle left the road and rolled over several times, killing his two passengers (17 and 18 year old girls). The accused had no criminal record, but had been convicted of offences under the Quebec Highway Safety Code. The Crown sought 6-8 years’ imprisonment followed by a seven year driving prohibition. The accused sought a sentence of less than three years’ imprisonment. The trial judge sentenced the accused to 6.5 years’ imprisonment on each count (concurrent) plus an 11 year driving prohibition. The trial judge considered the prevalence of impaired driving in the region, noting that it appeared that driving while impaired appeared trivialized more there than anywhere else. The accused appealed.
The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to four years’ imprisonment and the driving prohibition from 11 to four years. There were three ranges of sentences in Quebec: lenient sentences of 18 months to three years where the predominant factors favoured the accused; harsh sentences of 3-6 years where denunciation and deterrence outweighed the accused’s personal factors; and very harsh sentences of 6-9 years where personal factors were unfavourable to the accused. The court held that the trial judge erred in placing the accused in the third range of sentences rather than the second. The trial judge placed too much emphasis on making an example out of the accused rather than his potential for rehabilitation. The court also declined to admit fresh evidence that the accused had breached two recognizances while awaiting sentencing (curfew violation and contacting a brother of one of the victims). The Crown appealed. The issues on appeal were: “1. Was it open to the Court of Appeal to substitute the sentence it considered appropriate for the one imposed by the trial judge, primarily on the basis that the trial judge had deviated from the sentencing range established by the courts for impaired driving offences?; 2. Was it open to the trial judge to consider the frequency of impaired driving in the region where the offence was committed as a relevant sentencing factor? If so, was it open to the Court of Appeal to disregard this factor in analyzing the fitness of the sentence?; 3. Were the length and the other terms of the driving prohibition imposed by the trial judge appropriate?; 4. Did the Court of Appeal err in holding that the fresh evidence the appellant wished to file was inadmissible?
The Supreme Court of Canada, McLachlin, C.J.C., and Gascon, J., dissenting, allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge’s sentence of 6.5 years’ imprisonment. The driving prohibition was reduced to two years and seven months, commencing at the end of the accused’s incarceration. The trial judge erred in considering an element of the offence (intoxication) as an aggravating factor on sentencing, but that error did not materially affect the sentence imposed. The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the trial judge erred in choosing the third sentencing category in the range of sentences for impaired driving offences. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal erred in substituting what it considered an appropriate sentence rather than determining whether the sentence imposed was demonstrably unfit. The frequency of similar offences in the trial judge’s district was a proper sentencing consideration and the Court of Appeal’s disregard of that factor constituted an error. The Court of Appeal also erred in failing to admit the fresh evidence on appeal, as it was relevant to the accused’s rehabilitation prospects. The court stated that “the sentence of six years and six months’ imprisonment imposed …, although severe, falls within the overall range of sentences normally imposed in Quebec and elsewhere in the country and is not demonstrably unfit”.
Criminal Law – Topic 5798
Punishments (sentence) – Prohibition orders – Respecting driving of motor vehicle – An accused was sentenced to 6.5 years’ imprisonment plus an 11 year driving prohibition, commencing on the date of sentencing – The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to four years’ imprisonment with a four year driving prohibition to commence when the accused’s incarceration ended – The Supreme Court of Canada restored the 6.5 year sentence and substituted a driving prohibition of two years and seven months to commence upon the end of incarceration – By including the words “plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment” in s. 259(2)(a.1) of the Criminal Code, “Parliament was making it clear that it intended driving prohibitions to commence at the end of the period of imprisonment, not on the date of sentencing” – The court stated that “where a driving prohibition is not only one of the release conditions imposed on an accused but also part of the sentence imposed upon his or her conviction, the length of the presentence driving prohibition must be subtracted from the prohibition imposed in the context of the sentence. In my view, therefore, the driving prohibition of four years and seven months imposed in this case is demonstrably unfit and must be reduced to two years and four months to take account of the recognizance entered into by the [accused] under which he was to refrain from driving from his release date until his sentencing date (two years and three months).” – See paragraphs 106 to 114.
Criminal Law – Topic 5801.1
Sentencing – General – Proportionality – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that the principle of proportionality stated in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code provided that “a sentence must be ‘proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender’. A sentence will therefore be demonstrably unfit if it constitutes an unreasonable departure from this principle. … The principle of parity of sentences, on which the Court of Appeal relied, is secondary to the fundamental principle of proportionality.” – See paragraphs 53, 54.
Criminal Law – Topic 5806.1
Sentencing – General – Sentence parity – General – [See
Criminal Law – Topic 5801.1
].
Criminal Law – Topic 5835.2
Sentencing – Considerations on imposing sentence – Categorization – [See
Criminal Law – Topic 5864.1
].
Criminal Law – Topic 5836
Sentencing – Considerations on imposing sentence – Deterrence – Prevalence of similar crime – A trial judge, in sentencing an accused on two counts of impaired driving causing death, considered the prevalence of impaired driving offences in the district in which he sat – The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge did not err in doing so, stating that “Even though the
Criminal Code
applies everywhere in the country, local characteristics in a given region may explain certain differences in the sentences imposed on offenders by the courts. The frequency of a type of offence in a particular region can certainly be a relevant factor for a sentencing judge. … Although the fact that a type of crime occurs frequently in a particular region is not in itself an aggravating factor, there may be circumstances in which a judge might nonetheless consider such a fact in balancing the various sentencing objectives, including the need to denounce the unlawful conduct in question in that place and at the same time to deter anyone else from doing the same thing. … considerations of procedural fairness will generally require that a judge who intends to attach weight to the local reality and to the frequency of a crime in a given region offer the parties an opportunity to make representations on the subject. … I am of the view that it was open to [the trial judge] to take judicial notice of the evil represented by the large number of offences related to drinking and driving that are committed in the Beauce district. [The trial judge] was the resident judge in that district. He was therefore in a position to observe and assess the magnitude of the problem in his region, especially given that it is well established in our law that judges can take judicial notice of the contexts in which they perform the duties of their offices” – See paragraphs 89, 90, 94, 95.
Criminal Law – Topic 5846.5
Sentencing – Considerations on imposing sentence – Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “Sentencing ranges are nothing more than summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives. However, they should not be considered ‘averages’, let alone straitjackets, but should instead be seen as historical portraits for the use of sentencing judges, who must still exercise their discretion in each case. … There will always be situations that call for a sentence outside a particular range: although ensuring parity in sentencing is in itself a desirable objective, the fact that each crime is committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile cannot be disregarded. The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation. It involves a variety of factors that are difficult to define with precision. This is why it may happen that a sentence that, on its face, falls outside a particular range, and that may never have been imposed in the past for a similar crime, is not demonstrably unfit. … sentencing ranges are primarily guidelines, and not hard and fast rules … As a result, a deviation from a sentencing range is not synonymous with an error of law or an error in principle.” – See paragraphs 57, 58, 60.
Criminal Law – Topic 5849.13
Sentencing – Considerations on imposing sentence – Drinking and driving offences – The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that denunciation and deterrence were important sentencing factors for impaired driving offences – The court stated that “while it is true that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation apply in most cases, they are particularly relevant to offences that might be committed by ordinarily law-abiding people. It is such people, more than chronic offenders, who will be sensitive to harsh sentences. Impaired driving offences are an obvious example of this type of offence … the objectives of deterrence and denunciation must be emphasized in imposing sentences for this type of offence.” – See paragraphs 72, 74.
Criminal Law – Topic 5864.1
Sentence – Impaired driving causing death – The 20 year old accused pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired driving causing death – The intoxicated accused, driving 130 kmph, attempted to make a turn having a recommended speed of 75 kmph – The vehicle left the road and rolled over several times, killing his two passengers (17 and 18 year old girls) – The accused had no criminal record, but had been convicted of speeding offences under the Quebec Highway Safety Code – The Crown sought 6-8 years’ imprisonment followed by a seven year driving prohibition – The accused sought a sentence of less than three years’ imprisonment – The trial judge, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and the prevalence of impaired driving offences in his district, sentenced the accused to 6.5 years’ imprisonment on each count (concurrent) plus an 11 year driving prohibition – The Quebec Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to four years’ imprisonment and the driving prohibition to four years – The trial judge erred in placing the accused in the highest of three categories of the sentencing range for impaired driving offences – That error of law led the Court of Appeal to substitute what it considered an appropriate sentence – The Supreme Court of Canada restored the 6.5 year sentence – The trial judge committed no error that justified the Court of Appeal intervening to substitute what it considered an appropriate sentence – Although the trial judge erred in considering an element of the offence (intoxication) as an aggravating factor, it was a “non-determinative error that did not unduly affect the sentence” – Accordingly, the Court of Appeal was limited to determining whether the sentence was demonstrably unfit, which it was not – The Court of Appeal also erred in ignoring the prevalence of impaired driving in the district, which was a relevant sentencing consideration – The court stated that “the sentence of six years and six months’ imprisonment imposed …, although severe, falls within the overall range of sentences normally imposed in Quebec and elsewhere in the country and is not demonstrably unfit” – See paragraphs 36 to 121.
Criminal Law – Topic 6201
Sentencing – Appeals – Variation of sentence – Powers of appeal court (incl. standard of review) – The Supreme Court of Canada discussed the limits imposed on appellate courts on sentence appeals under s. 687 of the Criminal Code – Appellate courts were not to intervene lightly, as trial judges had a broad discretion to impose the sentence they considered appropriate within the limits established by law – The court stated that “consideration of the fitness of a sentence does not justify an appellate court taking an interventionist approach on appeal … an error in principle, the failure to consider a relevant factor or the erroneous consideration of an aggravating or mitigating factor will justify appellate intervention only where it appears from the trial judge’s decision that such an error had an impact on the sentence. … an appellate court may not intervene simply because it would have weighed the relevant factors differently. … the choice of a sentencing range or of a category within a range falls within the trial judge’s discretion and cannot in itself constitute a reviewable error. An appellate court may not therefore intervene on the ground that it would have put the sentence in a different range or category. It may intervene only if the sentence the trial judge imposed is demonstrably unfit. … a sentence must be ‘proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender’. A sentence will therefore be demonstrably unfit if it constitutes an unreasonable departure from this principle. … The determination of whether a sentence is fit also requires that the sentencing objectives set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code and the other sentencing principles set out in s. 718.2 be taken into account. Once again, however, it is up to the trial judge to properly weigh these various principles and objectives, whose relative importance will necessarily vary with the nature of the crime and the circumstances in which it was committed.” – See paragraphs 36 to 54.
Criminal Law – Topic 6218
Sentencing – Appeals – Variation of sentence – Evidence on appeal (incl. fresh evidence) – The accused was sentenced on two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm – The Crown, on the accused’s sentence appeal, sought to introduce fresh evidence of the accused’s two breaches of his recognizances (curfew violation and contacting a brother of one of the victims) – The Crown argued that the breaches would have affected the trial judge’s decision as the breaches related to the accused’s prospects for rehabilitation – The Court of Appeal declined to admit the fresh evidence – The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal erred in not admitting the relevant fresh evidence – The court stated that “Although the two breaches in question are not actually related to the operation of a motor vehicle, they are evidence of a lack of respect on the [accused’s] part for court orders and for the law, which relates directly to the conditions for his rehabilitation. … the evidence of the two breaches of the recognizances could have affected the weight given to the favourable presentence report and could therefore have affected the final sentencing decision.” – See paragraphs 106 to 120.
Practice – Topic 9031
Appeals – Evidence on appeal – Admission of ”new evidence” or ”fresh evidence” – [See
Criminal Law – Topic 6218
].
Cases Noticed:
R. v. Proulx (J.K.D.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61; 249 N.R. 201; 142 Man.R.(2d) 161; 212 W.A.C. 161; 2000 SCC 5, refd to. [para. 5].
R. v. Lépine, 2007 QCCA 70, refd to. [para. 5].
R. v. Brutus, 2009 QCCA 1382, refd to. [para. 5].
R. v. Stimson (K.A.) (2011), 499 A.R. 185; 514 W.A.C. 185; 2011 ABCA 59, refd to. [para. 5].
R. v. McIlwrick (J.R.) (2008), 461 A.R. 16; 2008 ABQB 724, refd to. [para. 5].
R. v. Junkert (M.) (2010), 267 O.A.C. 7; 103 O.R.(3d) 284; 2010 ONCA 549, refd to. [para. 5].
R. v. Ruizfuentes (H.S.) (2010), 258 Man.R.(2d) 220; 499 W.A.C. 220; 2010 MBCA 90, refd to. [para. 5].
R. v. Bernshaw (N.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 254; 176 N.R. 81; 53 B.C.A.C. 1; 87 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 8].
R. v. Comeau, 2008 QCCQ 4804, refd to. [para. 30].
R. v. Paré, 2011 QCCA 2047, refd to. [para. 30].
R. v. Shropshire (M.T.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227; 188 N.R. 284; 65 B.C.A.C. 37; 106 W.A.C. 37, refd to. [para. 39].
R. v. L.M., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163; 374 N.R. 351; 2008 SCC 31, refd to. [para. 39].
R. v. L.F.W., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 132; 249 N.R. 345; 185 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1; 562 A.P.R. 1, refd to. [para. 39].
R. v. Nasogaluak (L.M.), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206; 398 N.R. 107; 474 A.R. 88; 479 W.A.C. 88; 2010 SCC 6, refd to. [para. 39].
R. v. Lévesque-Chaput, 2010 QCCA 640, refd to. [para. 43].
R. v. Gavin, 2009 QCCA 1, refd to. [para. 45].
R. v. Didhu, 2009 QCCA 2441, refd to. [para. 46].
R. v. Flight (R.I.) (2014), 584 A.R. 392; 623 W.A.C. 392; 2014 ABCA 380, refd to. [para. 47].
R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; 194 N.R. 321; 73 B.C.A.C. 81; 120 W.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 48].
R. v. Ramage (R.) (2010), 265 O.A.C. 158; 257 C.C.C.(3d) 261; 2010 ONCA 488, refd to. [para. 48].
R. v. McKnight (R.) (1999), 119 O.A.C. 364; 135 C.C.C.(3d) 41 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 49].
R. v. Rezaie (M.) (1996), 96 O.A.C. 268; 31 O.R.(3d) 713 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 52].
R. v. McDonnell (T.E.), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948; 210 N.R. 241; 196 A.R. 321; 141 W.A.C. 321, refd to. [para. 57].
R. v. Keepness (D.L.) et al. (2010), 359 Sask.R. 34; 494 W.A.C. 34; 2010 SKCA 69, refd to. [para. 57].
R. v. Verreault, 2008 QCCA 2284, refd to. [para. 64].
R. v. Morneau, 2009 QCCA 1496, refd to. [para. 64].
R. v. Bear (C.C.) (2008), 320 Sask.R. 12; 444 W.A.C. 12; 2008 SKCA 172, refd to. [para. 65].
R. v. Berner (C.-A.) (2013), 337 B.C.A.C. 146; 576 W.A.C. 146; 297 C.C.C.(3d) 69; 2013 BCCA 188, refd to. [para. 65].
R. v. Kummer (A.L.) (2011), 273 O.A.C. 378; 103 O.R.(3d) 649; 2011 ONCA 39, refd to. [para. 66].
R. v. Wood (J.) (2005), 197 O.A.C. 43; 196 C.C.C.(3d) 155 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 70].
R. v. C.O. (2008), 241 O.A.C. 1; 91 O.R.(3d) 528 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 81].
R. v. Wright (G.A.) (2013), 566 A.R. 192; 597 W.A.C. 192; 2013 ABCA 428, refd to. [para. 81].
R. v. J.B., 2015 QCCQ 1884, refd to. [para. 85].
R. v. Tang, 2010 QCCS 5009, refd to. [para. 85].
R. v. Valiquette, 2004 CanLII 20126 (Que. C.A.), refd to. [para. 91].
R. v. Morrissette (1970), 1 C.C.C.(2d) 307 (Sask. C.A.), refd to. [para. 93].
R. v. Laurila (B.A.) (2010), 296 B.C.A.C. 139; 503 W.A.C. 139; 2010 BCCA 535, refd to. [para. 93].
R. v. Woghiren (E.), [2004] O.A.C. Uned. 608; 2004 CanLII 46649 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 93].
R. v. Z.Z., 2013 QCCA 1498, refd to. [para. 95].
R. v. Hernandez (J.) et al. (2009), 277 B.C.A.C. 120; 469 W.A.C. 120 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 95].
R. v. Nguyen – see R. v. Hernandez (J.) et al.
R. v. MacDougall (P.A.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 45; 231 N.R. 147; 168 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 83; 517 A.P.R. 8, refd to. [para. 95].
R. v. Dumais, 2010 QCCA 1030, refd to. [para. 98].
R. v. St-Germain, 2015 QCCA 1108, refd to. [para. 101].
R. v. Pelletier, 2008 QCCA 1616, refd to. [para. 102].
R. v. Laycock (1989), 51 C.C.C.(3d) 65 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 107].
R. v. Bilodeau, 2013 QCCA 980, refd to. [para. 111].
R. v. Williams (E.) (2009), 346 N.B.R.(2d) 164; 892 A.P.R. 164; 2009 NBPC 16, refd to. [para. 111].
R. v. Downes (C.) (2006), 208 O.A.C. 324; 79 O.R.(3d) 321 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 112].
R. v. Ijam (G.) (2007), 228 O.A.C. 296; 87 O.R.(3d) 81; 2007 ONCA 597, refd to. [para. 112].
R. v. Panday (A.) et al. (2007), 228 O.A.C. 160; 87 O.R.(3d) 1; 2007 ONCA 598, refd to. [para. 112].
R. v. Sharma, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 814; 134 N.R. 368; 53 O.A.C. 288, refd to. [para. 113].
R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759; 30 N.R. 181, refd to. [para. 115].
R. v. Lévesque (R.), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 487; 260 N.R. 165; 2000 SCC 47, refd to. [para. 116].
R. v. Angelillo (G.), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 728; 355 N.R. 226; 2006 SCC 55, refd to. [para. 116].
R. v. Lees, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 749; 27 N.R. 548, refd to. [para. 119].
R. v. Nur (H.), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773; 469 N.R. 1; 332 O.A.C. 208; 2015 SCC 15, refd to. [para. 127].
R. v. Gladue (J.T.), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688; 238 N.R. 1; 121 B.C.A.C. 161; 198 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 127].
R. v. Priest (J.) (1996), 93 O.A.C. 163; 30 O.R.(3d) 538 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 128].
R. v. M.R. (2010), 73 C.R.(6th) 136; 2010 QCCA 16, refd to. [para. 128].
R. v. J.L.M.A. (2010), 499 A.R. 1; 514 W.A.C. 1; 264 C.C.C.(3d) 134; 2010 ABCA 363, refd to. [para. 130].
R. v. Arcand – see R. v. J.L.M.A.
R. v. Hamilton (M.A.) et al. (2004), 189 O.A.C. 90; 72 O.R.(3d) 1 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 131].
R. v. Hawkins (H.J.) (2011), 298 N.S.R.(2d) 53; 945 A.P.R. 53; 2011 NSCA 7, refd to. [para. 133].
R. v. J.W. (1997), 99 O.A.C. 161; 33 O.R.(3d) 225 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 133].
R. v. Wismayer – see R. v. J.W.
R. v. Coffin (2006), 210 C.C.C.(3d) 227; 2006 QCCA 471, refd to. [para. 133].
R. v. Leask (J.C.) et al. (1996), 113 Man.R.(2d) 265; 131 W.A.C. 265 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 134].
R. v. Stone (B.T.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290; 239 N.R. 201; 123 B.C.A.C. 1; 201 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 138].
R. v. Gallon (R.S.) (2006), 297 N.B.R.(2d) 317; 771 A.P.R. 317; 2006 NBCA 31, refd to. [para. 139].
R. v. Biancofiore (N.F.) (1997), 103 O.A.C. 292; 35 O.R.(3d) 782 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 139].
R. v. Gagnon (1998), 130 C.C.C.(3d) 194 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 139].
R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368; 43 N.R. 361, refd to. [para. 140].
R. v. Orr (C.) (2008), 251 B.C.A.C. 303; 420 W.A.C. 303; 228 C.C.C.(3d) 432; 2008 BCCA 76, refd to. [para. 142].
R. v. Dass (S.), [2008] O.T.C. Uned. 639; 2008 CanLII 13191 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 146].
R. v. Dankyi (E.) (1993), 59 Q.A.C. 118; 86 C.C.C.(3d) 368 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 146].
R. v. Spence (S.A.), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458; 342 N.R. 126; 206 O.A.C. 150; 2005 SCC 71, refd to. [para. 156].
R. v. Witvoet (R.W.) (2015), 600 A.R. 200; 645 W.A.C. 200; 2015 ABCA 152, refd to. [para. 159].
R. v. Bartlett (D.) (2005), 252 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 154; 756 A.P.R. 154; 2005 NLCA 75, refd to. [para. 159].
R. v. Joseph (D.W.) (2012), 326 B.C.A.C. 312; 554 W.A.C. 312; 2012 BCCA 359, refd to. [para. 159].
R. v. Provost (C.J.) (2006), 256 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 205; 773 A.P.R. 205; 2006 NLCA 30, refd to. [para. 161].
R. v. Alarie (1980), 28 C.R.(3d) 73 (Que. Ct. Sess. P.), refd to. [para. 162].
R. v. Charles (A.A.), [2011] B.C.A.C. Uned. 43; 10 M.V.R.(6th) 177; 2011 BCCA 68, affing. [2009] B.C.T.C. Uned. 1391; 2009 BCSC 1391, refd to. [para. 168].
R. v. Olsen (C.M.) (2011), 515 A.R. 76; 532 W.A.C. 76; 2011 ABCA 308, refd to. [para. 170].
R. v. Nottebrock (A.K.) (2014), 601 A.R. 118; 15 Alta. L.R.(4th) 114; 2014 ABQB 662, refd to. [para. 172].
R. v. Cooper (M.) (2007), 255 N.S.R.(2d) 18; 814 A.P.R. 18; 2007 NSSC 130, refd to. [para. 173].
R. v. Cote (D.A.) (2007), 300 Sask.R. 194; 2007 SKPC 100, refd to. [para. 173],
R. v. York (K.J.) (2015), 600 A.R. 1; 645 W.A.C. 1; 70 M.V.R.(6th) 4; 2015 ABCA 129, refd to. [para. 173].
R. v. Gravel, 2013 QCCQ 10482, refd to. [para. 173].
R. v. Comeau, 2009 QCCA 1175, refd to. [para. 173].
R. v. Côté, [2002] AZ-50111141 (C.Q.), refd to. [para. 173].
R. v. Bois, 2015 CanLII 10575 (C.Q.), refd to. [para. 173].
R. v. R.N.S., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 149; 249 N.R. 365; 132 B.C.A.C. 1; 215 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 175].
R. v. Pellicore (N.), [1997] O.J. No. 226 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 177].
Statutes Noticed:
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 259(2)(a); sect. 259(2)(a.1) [para. 107]; sect. 687(1), sect. 687(2) [para. 38].
Counsel:
Régis Boisvert and Audrey Roy-Cloutier, for the appellant;
Alain Dumas and Geneviève Bertrand, for the respondent;
Joanne Dartana, for the intervenor.
Solicitors of Record:
Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales du Quebec, Quebec, for the appellant;
Dumas Gagné Théberge, Quebec, for the respondent;
Attorney General of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, for the intervenor.
This appeal was heard on May 15, 2015, before McLachlin, C.J.C., Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon and Côté, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.
On December 17, 2015, the judgment of the Court was delivered in both official languages and the following opinions were filed:
Wagner, J. (Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Côté, JJ., concurring) – see paragraphs 1 to 121;
Gascon, J. (McLachlin, C.J.C., concurring), dissenting – see paragraphs 122 to 183.
