R. v. Morin (1992), 134 N.R. 321 (SCC)
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[French language version follows English language version]
[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]
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Darlene Morin (appellant) v. Her Majesty the Queen (respondent) and The Attorney General of Canada (intervenor)
(No. 21996)
Indexed As: R. v. Morin
Supreme Court of Canada
Lamer, C.J.C., La Forest,
Sopinka, Gonthier, McLachlin,
Stevenson and Iacobucci, JJ.
March 26, 1992.
Summary:
The accused was charged with driving while having an excessive blood-alcohol content. At trial, 14½ months later, the accused moved for a stay of proceedings, alleging a denial of her right to be tried within a reasonable time (Charter, s. 11(b)).
The Ontario Provincial Court, per Dodds, Prov. Ct. J., dismissed the motion and convicted the accused. The accused appealed.
The Ontario District Court, per Murphy, Dist. Ct. J., allowed the appeal and entered a stay of proceedings. The Crown appealed.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, in a decision reported 38 O.A.C. 298, allowed the appeal, set aside the stay of proceedings and restored the conviction. The accused ap-pealed.
The Supreme Court of Canada, Lamer, C.J.C., dissenting, dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused’s rights under s. 11(b) were not violated.
Civil Rights – Topic 3262
Trials – Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings – Speedy trial – Accused’s right to – Waiver of right – The accused was charged with a breathalyzer offence in January 1988 – At her first court appearance in February 1988 she was given a trial date in March 1989, some 14½ months after she was charged – Her counsel asked if this was the earliest date and the court answered in the affirmative – At trial she raised the issue of delay – The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the accused neither expressly nor impliedly waived her right to a trial within a reasonable time – “Waiver must be clear and unequivocal and with full knowledge of the right one is waiving” – See paragraph 62.
Civil Rights – Topic 3265
Trials – Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings – Speedy trial – Accused’s right to – Within a reasonable time – What constitutes – The accused was charged with alcohol related driving offences in January 1988 – She was given the earliest possible trial date which was in March 1989 – Twelve months of the 14½ month delay was caused solely by limits on the institutional resources of the courts (systemic delay) – The accused argued that the delay constituted a denial of her right to be tried within a reasonable time (Charter, s. 11(b)) – The Supreme Court of Canada held that there was no breach of s. 11(b).
Civil Rights – Topic 3265
Trials – Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings – Speedy trial – Accused’s right to – Within a reasonable time – What constitutes – Section 11(b) of the Charter provided that a person charged with an offence had the right to a trial within a reasonable time – The Supreme Court of Canada discussed the jurisprudential development of s. 11(b) and the purpose of the provision – See paragraphs 17 to 25 – The court thereafter discussed the approach to be taken in determining if a particular delay is unreasonable (i.e., the factors) – See paragraphs 26 to 59.
Civil Rights – Topic 3265
Trials – Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings – Speedy trial – Accused’s right to – Within a reasonable time – What constitutes – In R. v. Askov et al., 113 N.R. 241; 42 O.A.C. 81, the Supreme Court of Canada held that as a guideline, “a period of delay in a range of some six to eight months between committal and trial might be deemed to be the outside limit of what is reasonable” – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “this guideline is neither a limitation period nor a fixed ceiling on delay” – See paragraph 43 – “A guideline is not intended to be applied in a purely mechanical fashion. It must lend itself and yield to other factors” – See paragraph 46 – The court discussed factors which might require the guideline to be adjusted – See paragraphs 47 to 59.
Civil Rights – Topic 3265
Trials – Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings – Speedy trial – Accused’s right to – Within a reasonable time – What constitutes – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “… it is appropriate for this court to suggest a period of institutional delay of between eight to ten months as a guide to Provincial Courts. With respect to institutional delay after committal for trial, I would not depart from the range of six to eight months that was suggested in Askov. In such a case this institutional delay would be in addition to the delay prior to committal …” – See paragraph 50 – These guidelines will require adjustment to take into account local conditions and changing circumstances – See paragraph 52.
Civil Rights – Topic 3265
Trials – Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings – Speedy trial – Accused’s right to – Within a reasonable time – What constitutes – The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that “the provincial courts of appeal are generally in a better position than this court to assess the reasonableness of their province’s institutional limitations and resources. Nevertheless, they must decide applications under s. 11(b) on the basis of correct principles” – See paragraph 53.
Cases Noticed:
R. v. Askov, Hussey, Melo and Gugliotta, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199; 113 N.R. 241; 42 O.A.C. 81; 59 C.C.C.(3d) 449, refd to. [para. 2 et seq.].
R. v. Hurlbert (1988), 66 C.R.(3d) 391 (Ont. H.C.J.), refd to. [paras. 6, 8].
R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659; 96 N.R. 241; 34 O.A.C. 165; 49 C.C.C.(3d) 289; 70 C.R.(3d) 209, refd to. [paras. 8, 9, 18, 25, 40, 85].
R. v. Stensrud and Smith (G.W.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1115; 103 N.R. 191; 81 Sask.R. 293, refd to. [paras. 10, 18, 20, 53].
R. v. Smith (M.H.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120; 102 N.R. 205; 63 Man.R.(2d) 81, refd to. [para. 11 et seq.].
Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, refd to. [paras. 17, 56].
R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; 67 N.R. 241; 16 O.A.C. 81; 52 C.R.(3d) 1; 26 C.C.C.(3d) 481; 29 D.L.R.(4th) 161, refd to. [paras. 18, 42, 58, 93, 94].
R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588; 75 N.R. 81; 78 N.S.R.(2d) 183; 193 A.P.R. 183; 33 C.C.C.(3d) 289; 57 C.R.(3d) 289; 39 D.L.R.(4th) 481, refd to. [para. 18].
R. v. Beason (1983), 36 C.R.(3d) 73 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 24].
R. v. Kalanj; R. v. Pion, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1594; 96 N.R. 191, refd to. [paras. 27, 30].
R. v. Korponey, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41; 44 N.R. 103, refd to. [para. 33].
R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383; 66 N.R. 114; 69 N.B.R.(2d) 40; 177 A.P.R. 40; 25 C.C.C.(3d) 207; 50 C.R.(3d) 289; 26 D.L.R.(4th) 493, refd to. [para. 33].
R. v. Bennett (1991), 46 O.A.C. 99; 6 C.R.(4th) 22 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 34, 40, 49, 56, 57].
R. v. Tremblay, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435; 79 N.R. 153; 25 O.A.C. 93, refd to. [para. 57].
R. v. Smith (J.L.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368; 99 N.R. 372, refd to. [para. 57].
Statutes Noticed:
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, sect. 11(b) [para. 1 et seq.]; sect. 24(1) [paras. 5, 31].
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, sect. 237(a), sect. 237(b) [para. 3].
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 253(a), sect. 253(b) [para. 3].
Counsel:
Alan J. Risen and Robert B. Kimball, for the appellant;
Murray D. Segal and Kenneth L. Campbell, for the respondent;
S.R. Fainstein, Q.C., and R.J. Frater, for the intervenor.
Solicitors of Record:
Risen, Espey, Oshawa, Ontario, for the appellant;
The Attorney General for Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the respondent;
John C. Tait, Q.C., Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, for the intervenor.
This appeal was heard on October 1, 1991, before Lamer, C.J.C., La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, McLachlin, Stevenson and Iacobucci, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada. The decision of the court was delivered in both official languages on March 26, 1992, including the following opinions:
Sopinka, J. (La Forest, Stevenson and Iacobucci, JJ., concurring) – see paragraphs 1 to 75;
Gonthier, J. (concurring) – see paragraphs 76 to 78;
McLachlin, J. (concurring) – see paragraphs 79 to 89;
Lamer, C.J.C., dissenting – see paragraphs 90 to 94.
