R. v. Valente (1985), 64 N.R. 1 (SCC)

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[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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Walter Valente (appellant) v. R. (respondent) and Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General for Saskatchewan, Provincial Court Judges Association (Criminal Division), Ontario Family Court Judges Association (intervenors)

(No. 17583)

Indexed As: R. v. Valente

Supreme Court of Canada

Dickson, C.J.C., Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer and Le Dain, JJ.

December 19, 1985.

Summary:

The accused was convicted of careless driving contrary to s. 83 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act. The Crown appealed, but the judge of the Provincial Court (Criminal Division) refused to hear the appeal pending determination by a Superior Court of whether the Provincial Court was an independent tribunal within the meaning of s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Crown appealed.

The Ontario Court of Appeal in a judgment reported 2 C.C.C.(3d) 417 allowed the appeal and held that the Provincial Court was an independent tribunal. The accused appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and affirmed that the Ontario Provincial Court (Criminal Division) satisfied the minimum requirements for an independent tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

Civil Rights – Topic 3135

Trials – Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings – Right to independent and impartial tribunal – Independent tribunal – What constitutes – The Supreme Court of Canada held that a judge of the Ontario Provincial Court (Criminal Division) was an independent tribunal within the meaning of s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, where the judge had security of tenure, financial security and institutional independence respecting administrative matters bearing directly on the exercise of his judicial function and where the factor of individual dependence on discretionary benefits such as extra-judicial employment could not reasonably be supposed to have any influence – Security of tenure was satisfied by a requirement that a judge be removed only for cause after a judicial inquiry as opposed to an appointment at pleasure – See paragraphs 27 to 39 – Financial security was satisfied by the judge’s right to salary being fixed by law with no way for the executive to interfere in a manner to affect independence – See paragraphs 40 to 46 – Administrative independence was satisfied by judicial control over administrative decisions bearing directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function – See paragraphs 47 to 52.

Courts – Topic 306

Judges – Independence of judiciary – General – The Supreme Court of Canada generally discussed the issue of the independence of the Canadian judiciary and in particular set out the basic conditions for an independent tribunal within the meaning of s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Courts – Topic 310

Judges – Independence of judiciary – Requirements of – The Supreme Court of Canada held that a judge of the Ontario Provincial Court (Criminal Division) was an independent tribunal within the meaning of s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, where the judge had security of tenure, financial security and institutional independence respecting administrative matters bearing directly on the exercise of his judicial function and where the factor of individual dependence on discretionary benefits such as extra-judicial employment could not reasonably be supposed to have any influence – Security of tenure was satisfied by a requirement that a judge be removed only for cause after a judicial inquiry as opposed to an appointment at pleasure – See paragraphs 27 to 39 – Financial security was satisfied by the judge’s right to salary being fixed by law with no way for the executive to interfere in a manner to affect independence – See paragraphs 40 to 46 – Administrative independence was satisfied by judicial control over administrative decisions bearing directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function – See paragraphs 47 to 52.

Cases Noticed:

Evans and Milton et al., Re (1979), 46 C.C.C.(2d) 129, refd to. [para. 11].

Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369; 9 N.R. 115, consd. [para. 11].

R. v. MacKay, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370; 33 N.R. 1, consd. [para. 23].

Statutes Noticed:

Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. III, sect. 2(f) [para. 23].

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, sect. 11(d) [para. 1].

Constitution Act, 1867, sect. 99 [para. 26]; sect. 100 [paras. 26, 42].

Constitution Act, 1982, sect. 52(1) [para. 5].

Courts of Justice Act, S.O. 1984, c. 11, sect. 53 [para. 53]; sect. 54(4) [para. 39]; sect. 56(1) [para. 28]; sect. 87(1) [para. 41].

Judges Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-1, sect. 40, sect. 41 [para. 29].

Provincial Courts Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 398, sect. 4 [para. 28]; sect. 5(4) [para. 39]; sect. 12 [para. 53]; sect. 34(1) [para. 41].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Canadian Bar Association Committee Report on the Independence of the Judiciary in Canada [para. 24].

Denning, Road to Justice (1955), pp. 16-17 [para. 35].

Deschenes, Masters in their own House (1981) [paras. 20, 49].

Fawcett, Application of the European Convention on Human Rights (1969), p. 156 [para. 16].

Green, Guy, Rationale and Some Aspects of Judicial Independence (1985), 59 A.L.J. 135 [para. 18].

Laskin, Some Observations on Judicial Independence (1980) [para. 50].

Lederman, Independence of the Judiciary (1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. 769809, 1139-1179 [para. 24].

Lederman, Independence of the Judiciary, The Canadian Judiciary, Linden, Ed. (1976) [paras. 20, 49].

Linden, A.M., Canadian Judiciary (1976) [paras. 20, 49].

Shetreet, Judicial Independence: New Conceptional Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges [para. 24].

Shetreet, Judges on Trial: Study of the Appointment and Accountability of the English Judiciary (1976), pp. 17-18 [para. 17]; 383-384 [para. 24]; 393 [para. 36].

Shetreet and Deschenes, Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985) [para. 24].

Counsel:

B.A. Crane, Q.C., and R. Noel Bates, for the appellant, Valente;

W.J. Blacklock, for the respondent, Crown;

Derek Aylen, Q.C., and Graham Garton, for the Attorney General of Canada (intervenor);

Real A. Forest and Angeline Thibault, for the Attorney General of Quebec (intervenor);

James C. MacPherson, for the Attorney General for Saskatchewan (intervenor);

Morris Manning, Q.C., for the Provincial Court Judges (Criminal Division) Association and the Ontario Family Court Judges Association (intervenors).

This case was heard on October 9-11, 1984, at Ottawa, Ontario, before Dickson, C.J.C., Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer and Le Dain, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

On December 19, 1985, Le Dain, J., delivered the following judgment for the Supreme Court of Canada.

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R. v. Valente

(1985), 64 N.R. 1 (SCC)

Court:
Supreme Court of Canada
Reading Time:
40 minutes
Judges:
Beetz, Chouinard, Dickson, Estey, Lamer, Le Dain, McIntyre 
[1]

Le Dain, J.
: The general question raised by this appeal is what is meant by an independent tribunal in s. 11(d) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
, which provides:

“11. Any person charged with an offence has the right

….

(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;”

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